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Abstract
How does the hysteric bear witness through her body? This article looks at ways in which,
from antiquity to the present day, the hysteric has borne witness to the anxiety of her
time, age and sex through the speaking surface of her skin. In the eighth century ce a
doctor tears the veil off the caliph’s concubine; in the Renaissance physicians and witch-
finders look for stigmata; in the eighteenth century hysteria is located in ‘the nerves’; in
the early twentieth century Charcot displays hysteria to audience or camera and Freud
‘wipes away’ the memories of Frau Emmy von N. What anxieties mark the surface of the
troubled young woman of today? In its conclusion, this article suggests that it is exposure
that haunts the outside of her body, circling it without protection, in a world where
‘health’ is not a pleasure but a duty.
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Juliet Mitchell wrote in an article of 1998: ‘hysteria’s existence is co-terminous with
written records of human history’ (Mitchell 1998: 117). In this sense, hysteria has
been witnessing human difference and distress from generation to generation since
records began. Hysterics do this in a very direct way, by speaking forth anxieties in the
form of behaviour or symptoms. Rather than transmitting memories through language
or other textual forms, they stand as the present (both temporal and spatial) of
memory as it is made perceptible in a body. If the hysteric’s body does the speaking,
it is on her surface – gestures, voice, the skin – that the act of speaking takes place. In
her, text is skin and skin is text; this is her visibility but also her exposure.
It has often been observed that the incidence of the condition ‘hysteria’ – or at
least the use of the term – has more or less disappeared from view. One possible
explanation for this is a kind of maturation process: ‘It seems, indeed, that nerve
specialists are right in saying that in our day it is becoming much more rare for people
to produce obvious hysterias such as, only a few decades ago, were described as
comparatively widespread. It seems as if, with the advance of civilization, even the
neuroses have become more civilized and adult’ (cited in Hárs 1998: 125). This was
written in 1931 by Sándor Ferenczi. So even over seventy-five years ago, the elusiveness
of hysteria (like the belief in fairies, always noted as something that ‘used to be’) was
lamented. He goes on: ‘But I believe that, if we are sufficiently patient and persevering,
even firmly consolidated, purely intrapsychic mechanisms can be demolished and
reduced to the level of the infantile trauma.
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What I want to do in this essay is look for the hysteric’s body again – and in
particular to look for what can be seen of this body ‘in written records’. Put differently,
I am interested in what is visible and audible in texts of the bodiedness of hysteria, how
it bears witness whether through language or despite it. If we look again at Ferenczi’s
argument, he is suggesting that the ‘infantile’ level is not to be found ‘deep down’, in
a past or other far-away place but, on the contrary, it is the very opposite of the
‘intrapsychic’, inward elements ‘contained’ inside the individual’s psyche. It must thus
be, unexpectedly perhaps, an element of the surface. Not evident any more not because
it is too deep to find but because it is right here. We need to find what hysteria is
saying in, around and on the skin.
Here is a story from the ancient Islamic world, translated from an eighteenth-
century Latin account into English by the Hungarian historian of medicine András
László Magyar in 1998. Gibril ibn Bahtishú (d. 827) was a doctor at the Baghdad
court in the eighth century CE: this is how he dealt with an alleged case of hysteria in
one of the caliph’s concubines. It is worth noting that stories of actions similar to what
László András Magyar calls this ‘therapeutic assault’ (Magyar 1998: 70) appear in
other sources and continue to be reported in publications in the eighteenth century
and as recently as the late 1990s.
In those days, Errashid’s concubine, while tossing and turning during love-making, raised
her arm and was seized with a cramp so that she was not able to lower it any more. Since
neither the compresses nor the ointments of the physicians could help, Errashid said to
Dzhafar: ‘This is the end, she will never recover!’ Dzhafar, however, answered, ‘I have a
very experienced physician, he is the son of Bahtishú. Let’s summon him here and tell him
what has happened to the girl. Perhaps he might find some remedy to her trouble.’ [...]
‘If thou, the Lord of Muslims, will not grow wrathful,’ said Gabriel, ‘I have an idea of
how I could cure the girl’.
‘And what is that?’ asked Errashid. But all Gabriel would answer to this was, ‘Let the girl
stand in front of us all so I can do to her whatever I want to do with her, but I must
request of you, Caliph, to restrain yourself and not to be overcome with sudden anger.’
At Errashid’s summons the girl appeared shortly. When Gabriel saw her, he walked up to
her hurriedly and, pulling her head back, tore off her veil as though he were trying to
strip her naked. Overcome with embarrassment and shame the girl raised her hands and
gripped hold of the bottom of her veil at the same time. At this point Gabriel declared,
‘Behold, Lord of all Muslims, the girl is cured.’ Errashid then ordered the girl to stretch
her arms out left and right. The girl obeyed him, to the amazement and wonder of all the
onlookers. The Ruler had 500 thousand drachmas given to Gabriel and made him his own
doctor as well as the head of all other doctors. When asked what may have been the cause
of the illness, Gabriel answered in the following fashion. ‘Movement and the expanding
heat caused a slight moisture to circulate into the girl’s arm. When she suddenly stopped
the movement of lovemaking, this moisture became trapped inside her muscles so that
only some similar motion was able to release it thence. This is why I made use of a trick
which allowed the heat to spread evenly in the body again and allowed the superfluous
liquids to be released from their captivity. (Magyar 1998: 65–6)
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I am particularly interested in this narrative because of the use of the surface – veil,
nakedness – as a ‘cure’ for hysteria. The cure is a violent one, and based on two
assumptions: first (explicitly), the humoural theory that justifies the change brought
about in terms of fluids, heat and so forth; and second (implicitly), the idea that the
symptoms are, while involuntary, also a form of deception from which only a violent
act of exposure can ‘release’ the sufferer.
Magyar notes that this woman may have cramped up in order to avoid her sexual
duties to the caliph; he also notes a political significance to the (voluntary or
involuntary) response of hysterical symptoms: ‘simulation is usually the last resort of
people who are otherwise forced into some undesirable activity’ (Magyar 1998: 71).
Like many other observers of the history of hysteria, he brings together two groups of
disempowered people, women and slaves. Elaine Showalter agrees: ‘As in the
nineteenth century [so in the period of “shell shock”], working-class men were linked
with hysterical women as the antagonists of doctors’ (Showalter 1993: 322).
I shall take a brief tour of pre-modern hysteria, then look at its most important
period, the ‘long’ nineteenth century, and finally take up some examples of the
arguable reappearance of hysteria (the hysteric’s body) in the last ten or twenty years.
Most people are likely to associate hysteria and the ‘famous hysterics’, as Jacques
Lacan puts it, with the early days of psychoanalysis, in particular with Sigmund Freud’s
joint publication with Josef Breuer, Studien über Hysterie [Studies in/on Hysteria] (1895)
and his later study, Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse (1901, 1905) [Fragment of an
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria], better known as the case history of ‘Dora’ [Ida Bauer].
Here is Lacan’s lament:
Où sont-elles passées les hystériques de jadis, ces femmes merveilleuses, les Anna O., les
Emmy von N.? Elles jouaient non seulement un certain rôle, un rôle social certain, mais
quand Freud se mit à les écouter, ce furent elles qui permirent la naissance de la
psychanalyse. C’est de leur écoute que Freud a inauguré un mode entièrement nouveau
de la relation humaine. Qu’est-ce qui remplace aujourd’hui les symptômes hystériques
d’autrefois ? L’hystérie ne s’est-elle pas déplacée dans le champ social, la loufoquerie
psychanalytique ne l’aurait-elle remplacée ? (cited from an unpublished paper given in
Brussels in 1977 in Roudinesco 1994: 82–3)
[Where have they gone to, the hysterics of yesteryear, those marvellous women, the Anna
Os and Emmy von Ns? They didn’t just play a certain role, a precise social role, but
when Freud started listening to them, it was they who allowed psychoanalysis to be born.
In listening to them, Freud inaugurated a completely new mode of human relations.
What do we have today to replace the hysterical symptoms of the past? Has hysteria
moved sideways into the social world, has it been replaced by the more grotesque
extremes of psychoanalysis?]1
I shall return to this question later on, perhaps not in such a rhapsodic tone, because
it may well be the case that the ‘sideways move into the social world’ is not such a large
step from where it always was.
The most common view of hysteria in psychoanalysis is this one: that (as Lacan
puts it) hysteria and the famous hysterics were its midwives if not its mothers. We are
all familiar with the invention, by Breuer’s patient ‘Anna O’ (Bertha Pappenheim) of
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the term ‘talking cure’ – she also used the term ‘chimney sweeping’, both in English,
when she was temporarily unable to say anything in her native German (Breuer and
Freud 1974: 83). Later in the Studies we see Freud treating a variety of other women,
one (Emmy von N [Fanny Moser]) by massage and ‘wiping out’ unpleasant memories,
another (young Katharina [Aurelia Kronich]) simply through a conversation on a
mountainside which he reports like a slice of drama. But, as Sander Gilman and his
colleagues show in the volume Hysteria beyond Freud (1993), hysteria was around long
before that. It was always problematic and always associated with women – even
though male hysterics have been identified since at least the early modern period,
sometimes carefully labelled by a different term, ‘hypochondriacal’, ‘melancholic’,
‘neurasthenic’ or victims of ‘shell shock’, probably to avoid the taint of femininity.
Hysteria is a name rather than a condition: most historians or theorists of the
condition, and most amateurs with an interest in it, now take it as a term with a variety
of contents, a series of uses, from antiquity to the present day. Its distinctiveness is the
special way it poses a problem of definition to the medical profession. As Roy Porter
puts it, ‘The body provides sufficient explanation of its own behaviour. Diseases are
in and of the organism’ (Porter 1993: 238), yet doctors had to justify their practice in
a world where Idealism meant that people mistrusted the focus on the ‘mere’ body. So
‘the program widely, if tacitly adopted by medicine since the scientific revolution of
locating disease explanations within the body seemed unexceptionable when
addressing conspicuous conditions – tumours or dropsy, for instance – involving
physical abnormalities. It has proved more problematic, however, where pain flares
up seemingly independently of manifest external lesions’ (239). The syndrome labelled
‘hysteria’ was such a condition. The patient’s body manifested pain, sensitivity, cramp
or paralysis – conditions often so extreme as to make active life impossible. But no
physical cause was in evidence. How then to explain, treat or even diagnose such a
problem? And what to call it?
The term ‘hysteria’ comes of course from the Greek word for womb and is
associated with a belief (of uncertain provenance but appearing in Plato’s Timaeus and
in Galen) that the womb, a weirdly anarchic ‘animal inside an animal’ (King 1993: 26,
citing Aretaeus), might go wandering upwards and block the woman’s airwaves. This
invisible but highly risky event could, of course, be treated only by external means, the
most popular being to ‘lure’ the wayward creature back to its place by scent therapy:
putting bad smells close by the nose and sweet smells by the vagina. But why were
women’s troubles diagnosed this way? Because of a theory of ‘female difference at the
level of the flesh’. Women were believed to be wetter than men, ‘loose-textured and
soft to the touch, thus by their very nature retaining moisture’ (18), and the risk to
them was of having insufficient moisture, which would cause the womb to break loose.
A popular cure was sexual intercourse – this is universally prescribed, by almost every
sort and condition of advisor, though in some times and places masturbation by
women practitioners was offered, and in others we note that neurasthenic men might
also by advised to marry as soon as possible (see Showalter: 1993: 296).
The unpredictable behaviour of the womb, and above all, the invisibility of this
unpredictable behaviour, makes hysteria the diagnosis of choice for an invisible,
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unpredictable set of symptoms. Some commentators call it ‘protean’: it is the condition
that can take any form, the problem often moving from one limb to another; we recall
this in Freud’s patients, who display a bizarre variety of coughs, catarrhs, paralyses,
olfactory hallucinations, and so on. This parade of symptoms or gestures is also, as
noted earlier, associated with the gift of display – Charcot, whose patients were
dramatically put on display to his circle of fascinated doctors, artists and amateurs, also
used photography as a means of record, and would describe some of the bodily
distortions as ‘clownism’ (Showalter 1993: 308) – and thus with a possible propensity,
especially in young women, to deceive and malinger. ‘Attention-seeking’ is the
contemporary version of this view.
Between antiquity and the birth of modern medicine, we see an interesting
progression of what George Rousseau describes as ‘a condition called hysteria without
a stable set of causes and effects […] a paradox. On the one hand, hysteria appears to
be a category without content; on the other, hysteria has an amorphous content
incapable of being controlled by a clear category’ (Rousseau 1993: 92–3). One of its
most notorious manifestations – exactly how the two are to be related is much debated
– is witchcraft: ‘modern hysteria or conversion syndrome […] first rises to prominence
as an explicit diagnostic category within the development of demonology’ (98; see
also Heinemann 2000). Essentially, the search for the ‘truth’ of possession and the
later search to interpret and if possible cure the manifestations of hysteria followed the
same process. Whatever their origin – most people tend now to the view that the
causes of the condition are a collection of social frustrations (the indoor fate of
bourgeois women, the terrors of shelling or the contemporary stresses of the male or
female executive) – their ‘truth’ is sought where it seems to be perceptible, on the
surface of the body.
In the Renaissance and again in the nineteenth century, these somatic [signs or]
dysfunctions were often called ‘stigmata’ by physicians searching for the ‘stigma’ of
hysteria. The line from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth is almost continuous
in this sense. Stigma was eventually altered to symptom in the semiology of clinical
analysis – in the seventeenth century – and this may be why so many medical lectures
appeared in the nineteenth century (like that of the French neurologist Pierre Janet)
entitled ‘the major symptoms of hysteria’. (Rousseau 1993: 111–12 – and see Gilman
1993: 352)
Central among these stigmata/symptoms was one that interestingly brings together
paralysis and surface: the symptom of numbness. Tested for by pricking the skin in
various zones with a nail or sharp instrument, this effect was observed alike in the late
Middle Ages and in the Paris hospitals of the early twentieth century. What is
numbness but paralysis – or perhaps more precisely, anaesthesia – of the skin? If we
consider this condition as an involuntary refusal to let the skin feel, we may find it a
useful gauge to return to.
In the seventeenth century, hysteria was established as ‘a natural disease rather than
a theological condition of the soul’ (Rousseau 1993: 115), and from then on, tied as it
was to ‘uterine debility’ (117) or at the least ‘the derangement of her vaginal cavity’
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(118), there grew ‘the idea that nature and perhaps even the deity had intended from the
beginning to program […] the female species for hysteria’ (119). It was Thomas
Sydenham (1624–89) who suggested in the 1680s that hysteria afflicted both sexes, was
‘the most common of all diseases [and above all, was] a function of civilization’ (140).
In the eighteenth century, the system of nerves linking brain to body became the
causation of choice. It allowed an apparently mathematical, modern, Newtonian
explanation of how emotion was manifested in illness and gave a somatic origin to
the typical malaises of the age: from vapours, spleen, melancholia and hypochondria
to the more dramatic dementia and lunacy. Responsibility was no longer laid on the
uterus, it was far more widespread, and spread all over the body, the latter being all
‘nerves’ – but in the form of a system. Rousseau concludes: ‘The desexualisation of
hysteria was, of course, one part of a movement during the Enlightenment that
demystified the entire body’ (158).
However, as Porter explains, ‘it was during the nineteenth century that hysteria
moved centre-stage’. Its ‘clientele broadened […] Shop girls, seamstresses, servants,
street walkers, engine drivers, navvies, wives, mothers, and husbands too, were now
eligible […] The coming of mass society evidently democratized the disorder’. The
concept of mass hysteria or ‘hysteria epidemics’ (Porter 1993: 227) came into being.
Hysteria gave ‘somatic contours [to] non-specific distress’ (229). The element of
memory – remember Freud and Breuer’s observation that ‘hysterics suffer mainly from
reminiscences’ (Breuer and Freud 1974: 58) – is marked on the body too and gradually
acknowledged as central to the ‘stigmata’ of the condition.
Porter uses a series of ‘internal’ metaphors: ‘medicine today remains deeply divided
as to whether hysteria is a skeleton in the cupboard or a ghost in the machine; a
phantom like “the spleen” or a bona fide disorder’ (Porter 1993: 231). But it is
increasingly with perceptibility – visibility in Charcot, audibility in Freud: to quote
Stephen Heath’s formulation: ‘Charcot sees, Freud will hear’ (Heath 1982: 38) – that
the question of what hysteria is and who its sufferers are becomes absorbed. The
question of how to ‘cure’ it and the parallel question of in what sense (or for what
reason) it might be feigned also become contained in the perception question, the
status of hysteria as phenomenon. As hysteria follows the positivist ‘rise of thought,
from the theological, via the metaphysical, up to the scientific plane’ (Porter 1993:
236), so the revision of stigmata into symptomatology progresses, using the machines
of the modern centuries. As neurology and pathology develop in the medical world,
so psychiatry, with its flower-garden of sub-specialisms, blossoms as well. More
particularly, medicine is consulted by the socio-political institutions: law, social policy,
hygiene, sanity, race and so on: ‘medicine [becomes] the very cornerstone of public
morals’ (249).
In hospitals, where a literally captive clientele of mainly working-class men and
women were available to the medical gaze, there developed a ‘massive clinical scrutiny
of hysterical pathology’ (257). At the Salpêtrière in Paris, ‘Charcot had some measure
of success in mapping hysteria onto the body’ (258). Translated to the middle classes,
this spatial metaphor can be connected to another: in what space does the ‘permeable’
body of women belong? Indeed, the womb reappears disguised in a new political
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debate. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, when
first-wave feminism and the ‘New Woman’ were appearing (Victor Margueritte’s
notorious novel La Garçonne [The Boy-Girl] was published in 1922) the ‘hysteria’ of
feminists was contrasted to the desirable alternative: ‘As women made their first
inroads into public and professional space, a fascinating alliance of artists, traditional
women, and neuropsychiatrists like Charcot united in a campaign to celebrate
maternity and the interiority of Women’ (Showalter 1993: 306).
As well as treating hysteria by pressure on supposedly ‘hysterogenic zones’ (307) –
the ovaries in women, the testicles in men – Charcot worked by rendering visible the
gestures and paralyses, asymmetrical posture or gait, and the aberrant hair or skin of
his patients. In Les Démoniaques dans l’art (1887) [Demoniacs in Art], Charcot and his
colleague Paul Richer analyse visual representations from the early Middle Ages. But
it is centrally in the new art of photography that, according to Gilman, the new
psychiatry found its focus – not only in the effort to expose or catalogue but also to
cure. Since hysteria is ‘the disease of images and imagining’ (Gilman 1993: 353), it
precisely fits ‘the “startle” effect inherent in the newness of the medium of
photography’ (355). If we go back to the earliest use of the medium, in the 1840s
and 1850s, we find a ‘shock cure’ remarkably similar to the torn veil with which I
began this article. Especially for working-class patients, who had little exposure to
high-art portraits or engravings, the shock of seeing themselves as they ‘really’ looked
could (apparently) bring about some sudden and striking cures. A paralysed limb
might suddenly loosen up, and this was in itself, albeit another echo of religious
miracles (‘pick up thy bed and walk’), a very modern miracle ‘in a society that demands
mobility as a sign of group identity’ (370).
We are still very much in that society. If we observe how, since the eighteenth
century, social decorum, professional success at any class level (shell-shocked soldiers
needing to be returned to the trenches just as much as devoted mothers had to return
to their domestic duties) and mobility in the public world seem both to necessitate
hysteria and justify its therapies, we can anticipate what might emerge at the end of
this history.
But we are not there yet. I want to look a bit more at some versions of the
emergence of memory in the psychoanalytic cure. Two different therapies vie in the
Studies on Hysteria: the main line, invented in tandem (we might say) by Breuer and
Anna O, is the ‘talking cure’ that Freud went on to develop with the consequences we
all know. I shall come back to it in a moment. As Maria Torok points out, the case of
‘Emmy von N’ (Fanny Moser) is exceptional in Freud’s repertoire of clinical technique
(see Abraham and Torok 1994: 234–48). His normal technique is the cathartic
method: bringing a memory ‘up’ out of the inaccessible ‘realm’ of unconscious
repression, by following the ‘thread’ of the symptom through free association, what
Anna O calls ‘talking off ’ her ‘“vexations”’ (Breuer and Freud 1974: 88). But in the
case of Emmy, Freud systematically deletes or ‘wipes out’ (115) her disturbing
memories through hypnosis. ‘Wiping out’ is both a more radical and, one could say,
a more superficial technique: it stays on the surface of the thing. The cathartic method
is spatially more extreme: it consists of a myth of emergence from depths.
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A nice example of this myth and how it works as a creative act, can be found in the
first volume of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu [In Search of Lost Time], Du côté
de chez Swann (1909) [Swann’sWay]. Here the memory of a loved and lost childhood
is ‘buried’ deep inside, seemingly beyond recall – but it can be recovered by a dual
technique, similar to the psychoanalyst’s practice but enacted by the ‘patient’ alone.
This technique is a subtle combination of chance and work. The chance element is a
sense-experience in the present moment: a middle-aged man tastes a cake crumbled
in tisane [herbal tea] and experiences a quite unexpected sense of joy. It cannot be in
the cake or the tea, for these are quite ordinary, not even tastes that the man
particularly likes. The joy is a free gift – but in order to understand it, he has to work
patiently at repeating the taste – but carefully, because it quickly loses its savour, bit
by bit – alternating this with relaxing his attention.
Je fais le vide devant [mon esprit], je remets en face de lui la saveur encore récente de cette
première gorgée et je sens tressaillir en moi quelque chose qui se déplace, voudrait s’élever,
quelque chose qu’on aurait désancré à une grande profondeur; je ne sais ce que c’est,
mais cela monte lentement; j’éprouve la résistance et j’entends la rumeur des distances
traversées.
Certes, ce qui palpite ainsi au fond de moi, ce doit être l’image, le souvenir visuel, qui,
lié à cette saveur, tente de la suivre jusqu’à moi. Mais il se débat trop loin, trop
confusément; à peine si je perçois le reflet neutre où se confond l’insaisissable tourbillon
des couleurs remuées; mais je ne peux distinguer la forme, lui demander, comme au seul
interprète possible, de me traduire le témoignage de sa contemporaine, de son inséparable
compagne, la saveur, lui demander de m’apprendre de quelle circonstance particulière,
de quelle époque du passé il s’agit. […]
Dix fois il me faut recommencer, me pencher vers lui. […]
Et tout d’un coup le souvenir m’est apparu. (Proust 1954: 46)
[I empty out (my mind); I place in front of it the still recent taste of that first mouthful,
and I feel something quiver inside me, dislodge itself, try to rise up, as though it had been
loosed from an anchorage deep within; I do not know what it is, but it is coming up
slowly; I feel the resistance of space and the sound of the great distances it is crossing.
Of course, the thing trembling in the depths of me must be the image, the visual memory
connected to that taste, which is trying to follow it towards me. But its struggles are too
far away, too dim and confused; I can just make out the neutral reflection of an
imperceptible whirlpool of colours stirred up, but I cannot distinguish its form or ask
it, the only possible interpreter, to translate for me the message of the real witness, its
contemporary and inseparable companion, the taste, ask it to tell me what particular
circumstance, what period of my past it belongs to (...)
Over and over, I have to start again, leaning down towards it. (...)
———And then suddenly the memory appears.]
The point here is not so much the actual object – past or present – a fairly simple
cake called a petite madeleine (in the ‘real-life incident’ Proust was eating a slice of
toast dunked in tea); indeed the unimportance of the banal object that provokes the
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drama of involuntary memory is essential (see Segal 1981). The crucial thing is the
flood of recollections – a whole world remembered, a whole text written – that
accompanies the process. Equally important, perhaps, is the mythic effect of
‘disanchoring’ something ‘stuck’ far inside the psyche, so that, to use Freud’s terms
‘where id was, there ego shall be’ (Freud 1973: 112). If we follow this metaphor
through we find another version of the importance of surface: an object consisting of
the new thing coupled with the old thing, a complete memory, enshrined in a creative
act, is brought forth – other physical parallels would be giving birth, ending a period
of constipation, a masturbatory orgasm, a bout of vomiting. Something ‘inside’ must
be made perceptible by coming ‘outside’. Only then can it become a textual witness.
What of hysteria now? I have already mentioned the belief that it has gone, at least as
a diagnostic term. The Bible of American diagnostics, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual: Mental Disorders, currently gearing up to its fifth edition, had dropped
‘hysteria’ already in DSM IIIR (1987), replacing it by a cluster of other terms:
conversion disorder, histrionic personality disorder, brief reactive psychosis, and so
forth. This has not stopped books and articles pouring forth on the subject, some of
them depressingly conventional in their ‘terrified doctor’ manifestations – a
phenomenon George Rousseau already notes in the 1620s (Rousseau 1993: 126) and
which, of course, harks back to the witch trials with their combination of aggression
and fear. For some up-to-the-minute examples, here are two essays published in 2005,
by Lacanians Sergio Benvenuto and Howard S. Schwartz: ‘Freud points out that Dora
plays the cock tease who encourages and withdraw [sic]’ (Benvenuto 2005: 15);
‘hysteria is not an underlying condition to which attention must be paid, but rather
a drama of an underlying condition engaged in for the purpose of garnering attention.
[…] Taken as referring to an independent self, the term ‘the woman’ has no meaning
(Schwartz 2005: 45–7).
At greater length but still without a gesture towards the feminist debates on
hysteria, there is Christopher Bollas’s Hysteria (2000), which is full of the difficulties
the analyst should recognize or expect with a hysteric, who may imitate a whole range
of other conditions (only the counter-transference can tell), may be ‘malignant’ (Bollas
2000: 127–45), ‘toxic’ (139) or ‘entrenched’ (147), may enact ‘betrayal’ (144) or
‘seduction’ (152–61), may be ‘ascetic’ (79) or ‘precocious’ (79) ‘flirtatious’ (81),
combining ‘the violence of the nun and the violence of the prostitute’ (144), is
generally ‘lying’ (150) but nevertheless is ‘always loveable and loving’ (173). The most
often used epithets are ‘teasing’ and – on one page repeated no fewer than four times
– ‘charming’.
One of the strangest arguments of Bollas’s book is how the hysteric’s mother
(usually also a hysteric) damages her child by physical care that dwells on the surface:
‘The original paralysis that enervates the hysteric comes through an enervation of
maternal touch’ (47). This does not mean that she fails to touch or ‘celebrate’ the
child’s body or being in general, but that she ‘refuses the infant’s genital sexuality […]
represses her relation to the genital and finds another part of the body to function in
its place [; thus] she unconsciously distributes the child’s erotism over the surface of
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the body, radiating in intensity away from the genital’ (47–9). The harm she does is
not that she is unloving but that her response to the child’s seductive demand is
displaced from its genitals to other parts of its body, its body surface or the ‘holding’
of cooing or storytelling. It is specifically the effect of her ‘dead hand touching the
genitals’ (178; see also 51) that will set in train the child’s inability to celebrate its
sexuality in a deep or normal way. In fact,
the hysteric is sexualised along the surface of the body and wears the ornaments of this
eroticism quite well, while sexual intercourse is not a part of surface sex. While the
normal person finds the surfaces moving the self towards increasing genital excitation and
demand, the hysteric finds this sliding towards the genital an unwelcome slope and cools
the self off with abrupt cessations of sexual exchange. (164)
I want to remain with this idea of the eroticized surface, though differently from
Bollas. In the week after Princess Diana died, a startling number of the many
newspaper features referred to her as radiant, glowing, a gleaming star, a crescent moon
or other source of light. Most accurately perhaps, Nicci Gerrard describes her as
presenting to us the ‘dazzling surface of our accumulated desires’ (Gerrard 1997: 23).
Didier Anzieu identifies the hysteric with a gleaming skin surface, a ‘double
enveloppe (la sienne propre unie à celle de sa mère) [qui] est brillante, idéale’ (Anzieu
1995: 149) [‘double envelope (the child’s united to that of the mother) (which) is
brilliant, ideal’] or an extra ‘enveloppe d’excitation’ (249, italics Anzieu’s) [‘envelope of
excitation’] which ‘caractérise non seulement le Moi-peau de l’hystérie mais constitue
le fond hystérique commun à toute névrose’ (249) [‘not only characterizes the skin-
ego of hysteria but forms the hysterical background common to all neuroses’]. Annie
Anzieu elaborates: ‘L’hystérique se présente en quelque sorte comme une superficie
excitable, dont le contenu ne répond pas à l’excitation’ (Anzieu 1996 : 114) [‘the
hysteric presents her/himself as a sort of excitable surface whose content does not
respond to excitation’]. If we combine this with Bollas’s conviction that the hysteric’s
surface is fatally eroticized, we might make a further connection with the almost
obsessive descriptions of Diana’s glowing skin. Whatever the specifics of Diana’s
childhood or sexual practice, these readings share a belief that the ‘gleaming’ surface
of the hysteric bespeaks a deviation from what Annie Anzieu calls the normal woman’s
‘psychic cavity’ (Anzieu 1989: 41).
I want to suggest a different reading of the surface-effect of hysteria today. It moves
away from the interesting though somewhat hectic argument of Elaine Showalter’s
Hystories (1997) that hysteria is alive and well in our time in the form of various
obsessive manifestations like chronic fatigue syndrome, recovered memory, multiple
personality, satanic ritual abuse and alien abduction. My interest in the surface of the
hysteric takes us, rather, back to the question of the feminine. Many people have
suggested that anorexia is the hysteria of our day. If we designate anorexia the illness
of the ‘ideal surface’ (that is, the surface as tight as possible on the muscular-skeletal
‘real self ’, without the ‘interference’ of fat) then we can see in it the over-valuing of
the external/visible which yet – in a typically hysterical way – ignores the ‘visual
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evidence’ of the mirror. It might be suggested that the treatment of anorexia veers
somewhat helplessly between the rest-cure imposed on such famous women as
Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Virginia Woolf and the startle-effect or tearing-off of
veils that consists of imposing a naked mirror image on the anorexic. Or perhaps
hysteria is more like bulimia – Diana’s condition – in which, actually, the negotiation
of surface and contents is radically invisible, moving in a circuit rather than a straight
line and thus cheating the scrutiny of others, maintaining secrecy, and probably
refusing the ‘normally’ suicidal tendency of dietary refusal. The bulimic’s skin
demonstrates its dual function by holding in and keeping out by turns, inviting
sensation and protecting against it. This is the basis of the circuit of bulimia – a circle
around, into and out of, the surface-point of the skin. My argument about Diana is
that the radiance identified by her fans and eroticized, whether by her or them, is (as
radiance always is) a similar kind of circuit.
To quote from my book, Consensuality:
Commonly, but mistakenly I believe in this context, we find the notion that Diana was
so apt a mirror because she was herself – at first, at least – a blank or empty reflector. Thus
to Hugo Young, unlike John Kennedy who was ‘the leader of the western world’, Diana
‘was an empty vessel’; or to Nicci Gerrard she was ‘the perfect vessel for our desires’
because during the years of her lonely marriage, ‘her cosseted surface bloomed and her
abandoned inner life dwindled’. By this reasoning the surface represents the inanition of
a proper ‘psychic cavity’: ‘like a fur coat, a beautiful but empty skin’ waiting to ‘[grow]
some insides’. This is the image of an ideal anorexia, the body as a sheer surface,
containing nothing. I want to argue, on the contrary, that we ought to understand
Diana’s skin in terms of the bulimic circuit, an image of exchange in which fluidity is the
key. What flows into and out of the dazzling surface of a beautiful woman is gender.
(Segal 2009: 104–5)
My final point is this: it is on the surface of the hysteric’s body that we still need to
look for the witness of hysteria. And the metaphors of spatiality – where is the woman’s
place? – are as pertinent as ever. The present-day anxiety of especially young, high-
achieving women is still focused on their visibility. Specifically, it is an anxiety of
exposure, one which, I think, is qualitatively different from other, earlier forms of
women’s visibility. Believing, as many do, that feminism has done its work for them
and is now a bit ridiculous; and believing, as everyone now seems to, that the body is
radically alterable and that we might be able to lift off our ‘second skins’ (Prosser
1998) and be our ‘real inner selves’ – either because, as Prosser argues, our inner male
needs to lose our outer female (or vice versa) or because the inner ageing lady we wish
our surface to belie is not really a truer self, since ‘woman’s vulnerability is in her
surface appearance, because it is where she lives. It’s on the surface that she is a woman
[…] her being/femininity (after all, they are the same) resides […] on her surface’
(Blum 2003: 98–9).
I disagree with both Virginia Blum and Jay Prosser in one major way: I stress
femininity not as something totally malleable (as the pseudo-Judith Butler argument
has it) but equally not as fixed at the level of visibility. It encircles that surface, haunts
it, preys on it. Hence the particular terror that is exposure. The inadequacy of our
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‘outside’ stalks us. Carried by us yet not belonging to us, it makes us all to some degree
hysterics, speaking through the text that is our skin. It may just be speaking in ways
we do not intend, like that of the classic hysteric, or it may be medicalizing us in a
more pervasive way.
In a seeming aside, Rousseau describes precisely the residual but powerful version
of hysteria that we live with today:
[the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century locales of hysteria] have not disappeared but have
been transformed into other social locations: the health club, the bedroom with its
paraphernalia of biofeedback machines, the therapist’s waiting room, the pain clinics,
even the beauty salons and ever-proliferating malls. Paradoxically, it seems today that
these are the locales of health and therefore of pleasure and happiness. Yet it may be,
upon closer observation, that they are merely the places where modern hysteria – what
our vocabulary calls stress – has learned to disguise itself as health. (Rousseau 1993: 100)
Note
1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
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